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COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE AFTERMATH
OF THE POLITICAL CULTURE WARS
IN SCHIAVO
KATHY

L.

CERMINARA

*

INTRODUCfION

Theresa Marie Schiavo died a celebrity at the age of forty-two
in Pinellas Park, Florida, in early 2005. 1 She never sought the pub
lic spotlight; she never even knew she was a celebrity. She became
a celebrity, and one of the best-known figures in bioethics, because
of politics.
In testament to the power of the politics surrounding Ms. Schi
avo's death, numerous authors have written an incredible amount
about her case. Many articles have focused on the constitutional
implications of the controversy.2 Others have discussed the inter
section of Ms. Schiavo's case and the interests of people with disa
bilities,3 or have analyzed the Schiavo case within the framework of
* Professor, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center. Thanks
go to Barbara Noah for the opportunity to write this, to Mary Coombs for assistance in
making this better, and to Jennifer Rolnick for research assistance.
1. Kathy L. Cerminara, Theresa Marie Schiavo's Long Road to Peace, 30 DEATH
STUD. 101, 111 (2006). For a complete interactive timeline linking to key documents in
the case, see Kathy L. Cerminara & Kenneth Goodman, Key Events in the Case of
Theresa Marie Schiavo, University of Miami-Ethics Program, http://www6.miami.edu/
ethics/schiavo/terrLschiavo_timeline.html [hereinafter Cerminara & Goodman, Time
line j (last visited Jan. 16, 2007) (listing her death at the Mar. 31, 2005 entry).
2. See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Terri's Law and Democracy, 35 STETSON L. REV.
179 (2005) [hereinafter Allen, Terri's Law and Democracy j; Michael P. Allen, Congress
and Terri Schiavo: A Primer on the American Constitutional Order?, 108 W. VA. L.
REV. 309 (2005) [hereinafter Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo j; Terri D. Keville & Jon
B. Eisenberg, Bush v. Schiavo and the Separation of Powers: Why a State Legislature
Cannot Empower a Governor to Order Medical Treatment When There is a Final Court
Judgment that the Patient Would Not Want It, 7 J.L. & Soc. CHALLENGES 81 (2005);
Thomas C. Marks, Jr., A Dissenting Opinion, Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla.
2004),35 STETSON L. REV. 195 (2005); Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life:
Lessons From the Schiavo Controversy, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 107 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Adrienne Asch, Recognizing Death While Affirming Life: Can End
of-Life Reform Uphold a Disabled Person's Interest in Continued Life?, in IMPROVING
END OF LIFE CARE: WHY HAS IT BEEN So DIFFICULT?, Hastings Ctr. Special Report
35, No.6 S31 (2005); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Judging the Schiavo Case, 22 CONST. COM
MENT. 457 (2005) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Judging the Schiavo Case j; Kathy L.
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end-of-life decision-making law. 4 Most of the attorneys and other
living participants in the drama have written books about their ex
periences in connection with the case. s While none of these authors
have ignored, or could have ignored, the politics surrounding what
happened to Ms. Schiavo, only a few have concentrated on it. 6 This
Article, building on what those authors have written, examines the
politics surrounding her death and draws some conclusions about
the aftermath for those left behind in the America Ms. Schiavo
departed.
I.

THE POLITICS OF SCHIA vo

Because of the extensive amount already written about it, this
Article will not recount in exhaustive detail the basic facts of Schi
avo. Instead, it will briefly introduce the reader to Ms. Schiavo and
then enumerate the myriad ways in which politics played a role in
her death.
Cerminara, Musings on the Need to Convince Some People with Disabilities that End-of
Life Decision-Making Advocates Are Not Out to Get Them, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 343
(2006) [hereinafter Cerminara, Musings]; Lois L. Shepherd, Terri Schiavo and the Disa
bility Rights Community (Fla. State Univ. ColI. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 188, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=882480; see also Sa
muel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 425,
427 (2006) (using Schiavo as a springboard to discuss the positions of disability rights
activists in the areas of "nontreatment of infants with disabilities, proposals to legalize
assisted suicide, and the practice of prenatal testing followed by selective abortion").
4. William Allen, Erring Too Far on the Side of Life: Dejii Vu All Over Again in
the Schiavo Saga, 35 STETSON L. REV. 123 (2005) [hereinafter Allen, Erring Too Far on
the Side of Life]; Kathy L. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm: The Far-Reaching Power of
the Forces Propelling the Schiavo Cases, 35 STETSON L. REV. 147 (2005) [hereinafter
Cerminara, Tracking the Storm]; John A. Robertson, Schiavo and its (In)significance 35
STETSON L. REv. 101 (2005); Lois L. Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth in
End-of-Life Decisionmaking: Terri Schiavo and Her Family, 35 CUMBo L. REv. 575
(2005) [hereinafter Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth].
5. JON B. EISENBERG, USING TERRI: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT'S CONSPIRACY TO
TAKE AWAY OUR RIGHTS (2005) [hereinafter EISENBERG, USING TERRI]; JON B. EI
SENBERG, THE RIGHT VS. THE RIGHT TO DIE: LESSONS FROM THE TERRI SCHIAVO
CASE AND How TO STOP IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN (2006); DAVID C. GIBBS WITH
BOB DEMoss, FIGHTING FOR DEAR LIFE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF TERRI SHIAVO AND
WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF US (2006); MICHAEL SCHIAVO WITH MICHAEL HIRSH,
TERRI: THE TRUTH (2006); MARY SCHINDLER ET AL., A LIFE THAT MATTERS: THE
LEGACY OF TERRI SCHIAvo-A LESSON FOR ALL OF US (2006).
6. See, e.g., George J. Annas, "I Want to Live": Medicine Betrayed By Ideology in
the Political Debate Over Terri Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REV. 49 (2005); Cerminara,
Tracking the Storm, supra note 4; Joshua E. Perry, Biblical Biopolitics: Judicial Process,
Religious Rhetoric, Terri Schiavo and Beyond, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 553 (2006). Keville
and Eisenberg identify one issue raised by Schiavo as being "whether politics and popu
lar opinion should play any role in individual medical treatment decisions." Keville &
Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 83 (emphasis added).
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The basic facts of Schiavo were simple. In 1990, at the age of
thirty-six, Theresa Marie Schiavo suffered a cardiac arrest. Initially,
her husband and parents were united in seeking aggressive treat
ment, including experimental therapy, in an attempt to revive her
from what physicians said was a persistent vegetative state (PVS).7
After three to four years of such efforts, however, Ms. Schiavo's
husband began to accept physicians' statements that she would
never regain cognitive function. 8 Ms. Schiavo's parents and siblings
did not. 9 Thus, they objected when Mr. Schiavo, acting as Ms. Schi
avo's guardian, approached the Florida guardianship court to ask
the court to determine whether Ms. Schiavo would want to be
maintained on medically supplied nutrition and hydration in the
condition in which she existed.
A.

The Litigation

When Mr. Schiavo filed suit in 1998, the case was a typical end
of-life decision-making case of no great import, presenting well-set
tled issues under Florida law. Florida law clearly permitted with
holding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment when a patient was
in a PVS.I0 Florida lawmakers also clearly considered medically
supplied nutrition and hydration to be a form of life-sustaining
treatment. l l Thus, if the court determined by clear and convincing
evidence that Ms. Schiavo would not have wanted medically sup
plied nutrition and hydration to continue when she lay in a PVS,
the law was clear that treatment should be withdrawn. After a five
7. The law uses the term "persistent vegetative state," although neurologists dif
ferentiate between a "persistent" and a "permanent" vegetative state. Roughly speak
ing, a patient is said to be in a persistent vegetative state when in a "cognitively
unresponsive state" for more than a month, and to be in a permanent vegetative state if
the condition lasts for twelve months. Nancy L. Childs & Walt N. Mercer, Brief Report:
Late Improvement in Consciousness After Post-Traumatic Vegetative State, 334 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 24, 24-25 (1996).
8. SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra note 5, at 87-89, 99.
9. See generally SCHINDLER ET AL., supra note 5.
10. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.302(1) (West 2005) (specifying that a patient may,
in advance, direct the withholding or withdrawal of "life-prolonging procedures" at a
time in which he or she is, inter alia, in a persistent vegetative state).
11. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.101(10) (West 2005) (defining "life-prolonging
procedure" to include "artificially provided sustenance and hydration"); see also In re
Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 11-12 (Fla. 1990) (finding a constitutional right
to refuse medically supplied nutrition and hydration); David Casarett et aI., Appropri
ate Use of Artificial Nutrition and Hydration-Fundamental Principles and Recommen
dations, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2607, 2607 (2005) (describing agreement that medically
supplied nutrition and hydration as being treatment as "well established among
ethicists, clinicians and the courts").
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day evidentiary hearing, during which it considered, and either
credited or discounted, the testimony of eighteen witnesses, the
court did so determine and authorized Mr. Schiavo to withdraw
treatment. 12
Thereafter began a lesson in the use of end-of-life litigation as
an exercise of political power. Numerous amici curiae joined in the
case, primarily vitalist and disability-rights activists protesting the
court's ruling and Mr. Schiavo's position in the litigation.1 3 Multi
ple motions and appeals caused the case to travel throughout the
judicial system several times between 2001 and 2003. It is not too
much to say, as George Annas has, that the attorneys filing the mul
tiple appeals were not "doing law" but rather "doing politics."14
Nevertheless, the courts continued to affirm the trial court's deci
sion. Ms. Schiavo's medically supplied nutrition and hydration
would be discontinued.
B.

The Legislation

After politics through litigation failed, it was time for those op
posing the withdrawal of Ms. Schiavo's life-sustaining treatment to
turn to politics of the old-fashioned kind. Citizens across the coun
try began to flood both the Florida Legislature and the U.S. Con
gress with e-mails and telephone calls, although many of them knew
nothing about the case other than what they had heard on the radio
or television, or had read on Internet blogs or in e-mails. In late
2003, the Florida Legislature authorized Governor John Ellis "Jeb"
Bush to order reinsertion of the tube through which Ms. Schiavo
received medically supplied nutrition and hydration. 15 After that
law was declared unconstitutional,16 federal legislators acted to au
thorize review of the case in federal court. 17 They also attempted
12. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908 GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000).
13. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm, supra note 4, at 154-55.
14. George J. Annas, Address at the Health Law Teachers' Conference: The Cul
ture of Life and the Politics of American Bioethics (June 2, 2006) (on file with Western
New England Law Review); see also University of Maryland Hosts 30th Annual Health
Law Teachers Conference, 14 LAW & HEALTH CARE NEWSLETTER 1, 3 (2006), available
at http://www.law. umaryland.edu/specialty/maryhealth/documents/program_newsletter
fal12006.pdf (providing a summary of the presentation given by Professor George
Annas).
15. 2003 Fla. Laws ch. 3, 418, Pub. L. No. 03-418 (2003), declared unconstitutional
by Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004).
16. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321.
17. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No.
109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
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otherwise to prevent adherence to the state court determination,1S
despite the tremendous amount of review the case had already re
ceived in the Florida state court system. At the same time, efforts
were under way, not only in the Florida Legislature but also in
many state legislatures across the land, to substantially revise end
of-life decision-making law in general, because of the Schiavo
case. 19
Terri's Law, the 2003 Florida legislation authorizing the gover
nor to negate the outcome of the state court litigation, transpar
ently put political interests above concern for appropriate
government· functioning. Michael Allen has called Terri's Law
"both an unabashed legislative intrusion on the judicial branch and
a simultaneous transfer of legislative authority to the executive
branch."20 He has written eloquently about its "gross deficiencies
under even the most basic separation of powers analysis," and has
opined that "[q]uite frankly, it is difficult to find any action taken
by a legislature or executive in the United States that can be classi
fied as such a fundamental breach of the constitutional separation
of powers."21 By authorizing Governor Bush to order resumption
of treatment, the law, written to apply only to the Schiavo case,
essentially empowered the governor to reverse a judicial decision
by acting as a super-surrogate for Ms. Schiavo. 22 Yet the law did
not require the governor to investigate, or even to consider, what
Ms. Schiavo's wishes would have been with respect to the treatment
choice in question, as surrogate decision-makers generally must.23
18. Allen, Erring Too Far on the Side of Life, supra note 4, at 135 (describing
attempts to subpoena Ms. Schiavo to appear before the United States House Commit
tee on Oversight and Government Reform as "motivated not by a search for accurate
information, but rather as a ruse for additional delay in the court-ordered removal of
Ms. Schiavo's nutrition and hydration tube"); see also Thomas W. Mayo, Living and
Dying In a Post Schiavo World, 38 J. HEALTH L. 587, 591-92 (2005).
19. See Cerminara, Musings, supra note 3, at 381 n.243 (listing bills); see also Lois
Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals Following Schiavo: What Are They Thinking?, 15
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 361 (2006) [hereinafter Shepherd, State Legislative
Proposals Following Schiavo].
20. Allen, Terri's Law and Democracy, supra note 2, at 187.
21. Id.; see also id. at 192 (describing Bush v. Schiavo, the Florida Supreme Court
decision that invalidated Terri's Law as "a protection of liberty and a rejection of tyr
anny"); Noah, supra note 2, at 116-20.
22. Keville & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 93-95.
23. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING 3-47 to 3-49 (3d ed., Aspen 2006). It was in fact the
lack of decision-making standards that led the Florida Supreme Court to note a delega
tion problem, not just a separation of powers problem, with the law. See Bush v. Schi
avo, 885 So. 2d 321, 332-36 (Fla. 2004).
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Clearly, Terri's Law had "nothing to do with substituted judgment
decision-making and everything to do with politics. "24
Even before Terri's Law was invalidated, and continuing with
renewed frenzy thereafter, the Florida Legislature considered ma
jor changes to Florida's end-of-life decision-making law in reaction
to Schiavo. The Legislature considered multiple bills based on a
National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) model statute. Those
bills would have limited the rights of Floridians to make end-of-life
treatment choices about medically supplied nutrition and hydration.
Additionally, the proponents of those bills intended them to re
quire restoration of treatment in Ms. Schiavo's case. 2S The Legisla
ture debated those proposals longer than the incredibly brief three
days it took to pass Terri's Law,26 but nonetheless engaged in that
debate in the heat of the moment, while receiving thousands of
frantic e-mails and telephone calls pleading for someone to save
Ms. Schiavo's life. After Ms. Schiavo had died, and when the im
mediate political crisis had passed, legislators reflected on what
they nearly had done and realized how much the frenzy had af
fected their judgment. At that time, it became clear that such a bill
would not pass. 27
Previously, legislators in Florida had done a superb job of de
veloping the state's end-of-life decision-making law in a thoughtful,
deliberate manner. Legislators had considered all viewpoints the
last time they significantly revised the law. At that time, they not
24. Keville & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 95.
25. Kathy L. Cerminara, Legislative End-Run Around Supreme Court in Schiavo
Case Threatens Separation of Powers, DAILY Bus. REv., Mar. 18,2005, at 13; see also
Annas, supra note 6, at 57 (describing attempts in Florida to pass "new legislation
aimed at restoring the feeding tube"); Jay Wolfson, Schiavo's Lessons for Health Attor
neys When Good Law is All You Have: Reflections of the Special Guardian ad Litem to
Theresa Marie Schiavo, 38 J. HEALTH L. 535, 537-38 (2005) [hereinafter Wolfson, Schi
avo's Lessons for Health Attorneys].
26. Noah, supra note 2, at 114 n.26.
27. See Maya Bell, Debate About How to Die Rages On, But Chasm Grows, OR·
LANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 26, 2006, at AI, available at 2006 WLNR 5017182 (Westlaw)
[hereinafter Bell, Debate About How to Die Rages On]; Maya Bell, Governor Aban
dons Feeding-Tube Efforts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 13,2006, at B7, available at 2006
WLNR 6227279 (Westlaw). The Florida Senate's Committee on Health Care studied
and reported on Florida's existing statutory scheme in late 2005, after Ms. Schiavo's
death. Interim Project Report 2006-137, Fla. S. Comm. on Health Care (2005), avail
able at http://www.f!senate.gov/datalPublications/2006/Senate/reports/interim_reportsl
pdfl2006-137he.pdf. The Committee concluded that, "Florida's laws governing the sub
stantiation and safeguarding of written and oral advance directives work for the major
ity of Floridians." [d. at 9. The Committee did not recommend any "statutory
changes." Id.
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only listened to experts and persons who contacted them about pro
posed revisions, but they also held public hearings across the state
to learn from the experiences of those who might not be able to
contact lawmakers themselves. 28 In contrast, the attempts to revise
Florida's end-of-life decision-making law in response to Schiavo re
sulted solely from short-sighted, special-interest-motivated attempts
to respond to vocal constituents with political weight.
During this same time period, and continuing after Ms. Schiavo
had died, myriad state legislatures similarly responded to the Schi
avo controversy by considering the same sorts of changes to their
state end-of-life decision-making laws. 29 Most of their proposed
changes also were based on the NRLC Model Act and, thus, prima
rily addressed the withholding or withdrawal of medically supplied
nutrition and hydration as opposed to other life-sustaining treat
ment. 30 Specifically, the Model Act would have established a pre
sumption that an incapacitated patient wanted medically supplied
nutrition and hydration regardless of that patient's medical condi
tion, unless the nutrition and hydration was medically contraindi
cated or the patient had previously explicitly stated, preferably in
writing, that he or she did not desire nutrition and hydration. 31
28. See Robert G. Brooks et aI., Advancing End-of-Life Care: Lessons Learned
From a Statewide Panel, 6 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 821 (2003) (describing the operation of
the Florida Panel for the Study of End-of-Life Care and the results of its recommenda
tions); see also Allen, Erring Too Far on the Side of Life, supra note 4, at 134-35
(describing the same panel); Wolfson, Schiavo's Lessons for Health Attorneys, supra
note 25, at 547 (describing Florida law on these issues as having been "carefully
crafted" through that process).
29. Mayo, supra note 18, at 597-98; see also Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals
Following Schiavo, supra note 19, at 11-14.
30. See Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo: Unsettling the Settled, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.
REV. 297, 329 (2006) (stating that legislation in many states was based on the NRLC
Model Act); NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMM., MODEL STARVATION AND DEHYDRATION
OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES PREVENTION Aer (2006) [hereinafter NRLC MODEL
Aer], available at http://www.nrlc.org!euthanasia/modeln&hstatelaw.pdf (bearing nota
tion "Revised January 2006").
31. See Nat'! Right to Life Comm., Spurred by Schindler-Schiavo Case, Model
State Law to Prevent Starvation & Dehydration Proposed [hereinafter Spurred by
Schindler-Schiavo Case], http://www.nrlc.org!euthanasialModelBillAnnoucement.html
(last visited Jan. 16,2007). Compare NRLC MODEL Aer, supra note 30, with H.B. 701,
2005 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (version introduced in Florida during the Schiavo de
bates). The existence of such a presumption in favor of the administration of medically
supplied nutrition and hydration echoes a presumption appearing in the Roman Catho
lic Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals (ERD) promulgated by the
National Conference of Catholic Bishops. Leonard J. Nelson, III, Catholic Bioethics
and the Case of Terri Schiavo, 35 CUMBo L. REV. 543, 556-57 (2005) (citing Directive 58
of the 1994 ERD, reiterated in the 2001 ERD). The similarity between the NRLC
Model Act and the ERD raises at least two concerns. First, one wonders at the propri
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Public opinion polls and surveys indicated that most constituents
did not in fact want end-of-life decision-making choices to be lim
ited in this manner,32 but politicians introduced the bills because
they listened to vocal e-mailers and callers, as well as to the power
ful special interest groups behind those e-mailers and callers. While
this simply may be one of the consequences of having a representa
tive rather than a parliamentary government,33 the phenomenon
certainly illustrates the power of political forces in Schiavo.
Finally, it is impossible to forget the most nationally visible po
litical activity relating to Ms. Schiavo. In early March 2005, slightly
more than three weeks before Ms. Schiavo's death, federallegisla
tors began introducing bills about the case in the U.S. House of
Representatives. 34 Later in March, in an "event unique in Ameri
can politics,"35 the U.S. Congress reconvened from Easter recess to
pass emergency legislation that would give Ms. Schiavo's parents
the right to file suit in federal court to have the case reviewed
again. 36 Just as in the Florida Legislature, debate was "frenzied"37
ety of an attempt to virtually pluck a concept from a Roman Catholic document and
insert it into state law in multicultural America. Second, even if such incorporation of a
particular religion's directives into law is appropriate, the ERD, as Nelson notes, is not
as clear with respect to withholding or withdrawal of medically supplied nutrition as
focus on this single provision would indicate. See id.
32. See Robert J. Blendon et aI., The American Public and the Terri Schiavo Case,
165 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2580,2584 (2005) (concluding, based on meta-analysis
of the results of twelve opinion surveys, that "[e]fforts to place more restrictions on
choices in cases similar to Terri Schiavo's are likely to prompt vocal opposition from
those who favor maintaining the choices currently available or expanding them").
Medical professionals would not like to see such laws either. See AM. MED. ASSOC'N,
AMA-YPS DELEGATE'S REPORT 4 (2005), available at
http://www.ama-assn.orglamallpub/upload/mml17/a2005delegatesreport. pdf (see "Res
olution 209," resolving that the AMA opposes such legislation); Gina Shaw, Schiavo's
Legislative Legacy: New Look at Consent, Living Wills, and Advance Directives, NEU
ROLOGY TODAY, June 2005, at 1 (describing neurologists' concerns about such
legislation).
33. Cf R. Alta Charo, Realbioethik, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 2005, at 13
[hereinafter Charo, Realbioethik] (identifying "fear [of] the ten-second spot" as one of
the reasons that a politician would not vote against the federal legislation regarding
Schiavo).
34. See Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at Mar. 8, 2005 entry.
35. Annas, supra note 6, at 58.
36. See Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo, supra note 2, at 318-20 (describing the
legislation, which granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims arising "under the
Constitution or laws of the United States related to the withholding or withdrawal of
food, fluids, or medical treatment").
37. Annas describes the debate in the U.S. House of Representatives as being
"notable primarily for its incredibly uninformed and frenzied rhetoric" and notes that
C-SPAN covered it live. Annas, supra note 6, at 61; see also Bagenstos, Judging the
Schiavo Case, supra note 3, at 458 (describing the "[l]ack of meaningful congressional
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and was prompted by myriad calls and e-mails to members of Con
gress from constituents who were themselves motivated by emotion
whipped up for political purposes. 38 The law itself, limited to au
thorization of a suit by Ms. Schiavo's parents,39 did not go so far as
Congress might have tried to go,40 but it nevertheless was notable in
terms of both policy-making and its manner of passage. 41 Michael
deliberation" in a "highly charged atmosphere" and "the attempts by many politicians
to use the courts (as weapons or targets) in a political battle").
38. See Ronald Cranford, Facts, Lies and Videotapes: The Permanent Vegetative
State and the Sad Case of Terri Schiavo, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 363, 369 (2005)
(describing a "strategy of misinformation" involving the use of videotapes originally
created to assist the courts in understanding Ms. Schiavo's condition "to mislead much
of the media and public into believing that Terri could meaningfully and cognitively
interact with her parents and thus was not in a vegetative state").
39. In that sense, the law seemed like a private law. The U.S. Senate website
discusses a private bill in the following manner:
A private bill provides benefits to specified individuals (including corpo
rate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through private legislation
when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted. Many private bills deal
with immigration-granting citizenship or permanent residency. Private bills
may also be introduced for individuals who have claims against the govern
ment, veterans [sic] benefits claims, claims for military decorations, or taxation
problems. The title of a private bill usually begins with the phrase, "For the
relief of ...." If a private bill is passed in identical form by both houses of
Congress and is signed by the President, it becomes a private law.
U.S. Senate, Legislation, Laws, and Acts, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/
briefinglle~laws_acts.htm (last visited Jan. 16,2007). The federal law was indeed titled,
"An Act For the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo." An Act for the Relief
of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, S.686, 109th Congo (2005), available at http://
www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/pdCfiles/032005-USSenate_ Compromise_in_Schiavo.
pdf. Yet, as is apparent from its citation, the Act has been accorded a Public Law
number. See Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
40. As Michael Allen notes, the proposed Protection of Incapacitated Persons
Act, H.R. 1332, 109th Congo (2005), would have gone further in authorizing federal
court review of whether the Constitution or federal laws had been violated in any case
in which the State court authorize[d] or direct[ed] the withholding or with
drawal of food or fluids or medical treatment necessary to sustain the incapaci
tated person's life, but ... not ... a claim or cause of action in which no party
disputes, and the court finds, that the incapacitated person, while having ca
pacity, had executed a written advance directive valid under applicable law
that clearly authorized the withholding or withdrawal of food or fluids or med
ical treatment in the applicable circumstances.
Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo, supra note 2, at 318 n.36; Protection of Incapaci
tated Persons Act, H.R. 1332, 109th Congo § 2 (2005), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-binlgetdoc.cgi?dbname=109_con~bills&docid=f:hI332eh.txt.pdf.

41. Allen identifies two levels of objections to it based on policy, as opposed to
constitutional objections. First, "[t]he ultimate result was federal interference in a ba
sic, personal decision, something that seems quite difficult to justify." Allen, Congress
and Terri Schiavo, supra note 2, at 315 & n.29. Second, the way in which Congress
passed it and the President signed it was "not the way in which many citizens would
hope or expect their government to form policy." Jd.
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Allen has aptly described this federal law as "appear[ing] to be fo
cused largely on a combination of political opportunism and politi
cal cowardice instead of rational policy determinations."42
These are only the major political activities, not even the most
bizarre ones, that surrounded Ms. Schiavo's death. The U.S. House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform incredibly at
tempted to use its subpoena power, as Ms. Schiavo lay dying, to
require that she be maintained in order to appear before it, with
equipment intact, for a hearing and an inspection of her medical
equipment. 43 It is impossible to forget the day Floridians realized
that Ms. Schiavo's case was being considered simultaneously within
the federal courts, the state courts, the federal legislature, the state
legislature, and Florida's Department of Children and Families. 44
That was also the day on which Governor Bush intended to order
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement to storm Ms. Schi
avo's hospice to remove her and resume her treatment. 45 Even af
ter Ms. Schiavo's death, Governor Bush ordered a prosecutor to
investigate whether Michael Schiavo had delayed calling 911 on the
night of Ms. Schiavo's cardiac arrest fifteen years previously.46
In sum, it is safe to say that politics abounded in Schiavo and
its aftermath nearly from start to finish, from the courtroom to the
legislature, to the governor's mansion, to the Oval Office. The task
remains to learn from the political firestorm.
II.

THE AFTERMATH

Schiavo unquestionably will impact end-of-life decision-mak
ing in America for years to come. Both individuals and individual
42. See id. at 314.
43. Exhibit 2, Emergency All-Writs Petition In the Matter of Schiavo v. Robert
Schindler & Mary Schindler, 932 So. 2d 264 (Fla. Mar. 18, 2005) (No. 90-2908-GD-003),
available at http://www6.miami.eduJethics/schiavo/pdCfiles/031805-USHousePetit ion_
Sct.pdf.
44. See Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at Mar. 23,2005 entry;
see also In re Schiavo, 932 So. 2d 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (describing state court
activity with respect to the Department of Children and Families' position).
45. SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra note 5, at 239, 307 (stating that these events all
happened on the same day); see also Dara Kam, Agents Readied in Case "Legal Win
dow" Opened, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 26, 2005, at 8 (describing plans to "seize" Ms.
Schiavo if an opportunity arose). Governor Bush also had ordered the Florida Depart
ment of Law Enforcement to rush into the hospice to take Ms. Schiavo to a hospital
immediately upon the passage of Terri's Law in 2003. See SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra
note 5, at 239.
46. Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at June 17 & June 27, 2005
entries.
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cases will be affected, while the general tone and pattern of end-of
life decision-making law likely will change. Even beyond the realm
of end-of-life decision-making law, the politics of Schiavo, for bet
ter or worse, serves as an example of a more general politicization
of bioethics. Finally, Schiavo teaches some major lessons about the
functioning of our American constitutional republican form of
government.
A.

Lessons for Individuals and Relating to Individual Cases

The political furor surrounding Schiavo will impact the individ
ual patient care setting in at least two ways. First, as has been
widely discussed, people reacted to Schiavo by flocking to hospitals,
clinics, physicians' offices, and other health care provider locations,
not to mention attorneys' offices, to obtain and execute advance
directive forms.47 While that development would seem to indicate
that health care providers in the future will see more patients who
have advance directives, such a conclusion does not necessarily fol
low. This reaction to a highly publicized end-of-life decision-mak
ing case is not a new phenomenon and is not likely to have a long
lasting effect. A similar rush to execute advance directive forms
happened after the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Cruzan v.
Director,48 but the percentage of persons with advance directives
still was not very high at the time of Schiavo, fifteen years later. 49
In fact, one wonders if Americans simply must, every fifteen years
or so, endure debate over the propriety of withdrawing life-sus
47. Shaw, supra note 32, at 2-3 (quoting the Death with Dignity spokesperson,
who stated: "All the web sites that help prepare advance directives have had a huge
increase in traffic"); Diane C. Lade, Free Seminars Focus on End-oj-Life Papers, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, May 10, 2005, at 4B, available at 2005 WLNR 23632439 (Westlaw)
(quoting Secretary of Florida Department of Elder Affairs as saying that the effort to
provide more information about advance directives "was in response to the Terri Schi
avo case"); Diane C. Lade, Schiavo Debate Hits Home for the Young: More People Are
Thinking About Living Will Forms, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 1,2005, at lA, avail
able at 2005 WLNR 23670975 (WestIaw) ("How do you get young people to make out a
living will when they have no concept of their own mortality? Two words: Terri Schi
avo."); Schiavo Case Revives Interest in Wills, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 24, 2005, at 14, avail
able at 2005 WLNR 13854639 ("As the struggle between [Terri Schiavo's] parents and
husband over the removal of a feeding tube continues, Americans are signing living
wills as never before.").
48. Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
49. PEW RESEARCH CrR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, STRONG PUBLIC SuP·
PORT FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE: MORE AMERICANS DISCUSSING-AND PLANNING
END-OF-LIFE TREATMENT 2 (2006) [hereinafter PEW REPORT], available at http://
people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=266 (showing that in 1990, 12 percent
of those surveyed had living wills; in 2005, the number had risen to 29 percent).
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taining treatment from a young woman50 to raise their conscious
ness about advance directives and to re-energize them into
discussing end-of-life treatment choices with each other.
The political furor sparked by Schiavo will also likely affect
individual surrogate decision-makers in the future. Michael Schi
avo endured a great deal of criticism, including death threats aimed
at both him and his family.51 State officials investigated his actions
and his motives several times. 52 During the heat of the battle, and
even after the autopsy on Ms. Schiavo's body, several commenta
tors opined that his recollection of her wishes must have been false
because he waited so long to voice and act upon those wishes. 53
Even if he truly believed that he was representing Ms. Schiavo's
wishes (and the court found that he was), he easily could have been
frightened into abandoning the pursuit of those wishes. 54 While
some would have praised such an outcome, and in fact may have
intended their actions to result in such abandonment, a precise and
critical examination of the criticism Michael Schiavo endured leads
50. The seminal case in end-of-life decision-making law is In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647 (N.J. 1976), which involved a young woman. In 1990, fifteen years after Quinlan,
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Cruzan, again involving a young woman. Then Schi
avo involved a young woman in the early twenty-first century. Ms. Schiavo died fifteen
years after Cruzan was decided and thirty years to the day after Quinlan was decided.
See generally WILLIAM H. COLBY, UNPLUGGED: RECLAIMING OUR RIGHT TO DIE IN
AMERICA (2006); Annette E. Clark, The Right to Die: The Broken Road From Quinlan
to Schiavo, 37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 385 (2006).
51. SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra note 5, at 287 (describing letters "that talked
about how kids disappear from their homes every day"); id. at 290 (quoting threat on
blog: "'If we kill Michael Schiavo, the parents will be her closest relatives. FL gun
owners, it's in your hands' "); see also Man Arrested in Alleged Schiavo Case Murder
Plot, CNN.cOM, Mar. 26, 2005, http://edition.cnn.com/2005IUS/03/25/arrest.schiavo.
52. The Department of Children and Families received, investigated, and ruled
unfounded, eighty-nine complaints of abuse in the four years after the trial court's deci
sion. Maya Bell, Schiavo Records Show No Abuse, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 17,
2005, at 6B. Even after Ms. Schiavo's death in 2005, Governor Bush ordered a state
investigation into whether criminal charges should be filed against Mr. Schiavo based
on questions about how quickly he had called 911 in 1990, some fifteen years earlier.
Abby Goodnough, Governor Bush Seeks Another Inquiry in Schiavo Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2005, at AI, available at 2005 WLNR 9670154 (Westlaw). After investigation,
the prosecutor recommended that no charges be filed. David Royse, Inquiry Finds No
Sign of Crime in Schiavo's Death, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, July 8, 2005, at 6B.
53. SCHIAVO WITH HIRSH, supra note 5, at 176.
54. At one point in early 2005, he was ready to abandon the case, but, at the
urging of his attorney, he decided he could not do so because "it wasn't just about Terri
anymore. It was about all the rest of the people who didn't want the government telling
us how we could die . . .. And whether we were going to let a vocal minority change
the rules for everybody." Id. at 288.
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to a surprising conclusion-one that the activists who protested his
position certainly would not support.
Michael Schiavo endured criticism on both a substantive and a
procedural level. Procedurally, the objection was that he must have
been misrepresenting Ms. Schiavo's wishes to refuse treatment be
cause he waited too long to voice those wishes. Focusing on that
criticism could cause a surrogate who is sure that his or her loved
one wishes to reject treatment to rush to carry out those wishes.
Michael Schiavo's delay, his willingness to try measures that could
obviate the need for life-sustaining treatment, resulted in suspicion
and accusations, so the lesson others take away may be to do the
opposite: authorize withholding or withdrawing treatment as soon
as possible. In other words, sadly, the political furor engendered in
Schiavo could encourage exactly the opposite sort of surrogate de
cision-making from that which society wants. Rather than giving
treatment a chance to work, and authorizing withdrawal only after
it becomes clear that the patient thereafter will exist in a condition
in which he or she did not want to exist, surrogate decision-makers
may react to the criticism leveled at Michael Schiavo by acting
quickly to assert their loved one's wishes. This is not wise as a pol
icy or a medical matter.
On the other hand, some of the criticism of Michael Schiavo
was a reaction to the substance of Ms. Schiavo's wishes, rather than
the timing of his assertion of those wishes. On that level, future
surrogate decision-makers, with Schiavo in mind, could hesitate to
carry out patients' desires to refuse nutrition and hydration because
they fear inviting such criticism themselves. Such a fear is likely
unfounded, given that most end-of-life decision-making takes place
privately rather than in a public setting. Nevertheless, after the
spectacle this country endured in early 2005, both surrogate deci
sion-makers and health care providers hereafter may unduly hesi
tate to honor patients' wishes to withhold or withdraw life
sustaining treatment. With good cause or not, they may fear spark
ing pUblicity and a major political debate.
Clinical bioethics expert Kenneth Goodman calls this phenom
enon "being Schiavo'ed," which he defines as "the fear of a case
becoming public and drawing a well-funded campaign to require
treatment."55 Although unlikely to materialize, the fear has foun
dation. For example, less than a month after Ms. Schiavo died, the
55. Bell, Debate About How We Die Rages On, supra note 27 (quoting Kenneth
Goodman, director of Florida's bioethics network).
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attorney who represented her parents asked a Georgia court "to
protect innocent life in the case of Mae Magouirk. "56 The
Magouirk case, like the Schiavo case, involved a family dispute
over whether a patient (in Magouirk, an 81-year-old widow) should
receive medically supplied nutrition and hydration. 57 Portrayed as
being inspired by the Schiavo case, the Magouirk case actually be
gan even before this attorney became involved in it. 58 Like the
Schiavo case, the Magouirk case spawned blog entries and e-mails
from pro-life activists to the presiding judge. 59 It even prompted
the hospice in which Ms. Magouirk was a patient to issue a press
release clarifying that it did not deny patients food and water. 60 For
unknown reasons, it never sparked nationwide furor as Schiavo did,
but it still serves as a stark illustration that the Schiavo-type, bitter,
highly publicized dispute is not unique. 61 Caregivers might not wish
to risk becoming involved in such a dispute, so they may continue
treatment beyond the time at which they and the patient would
have wanted to cease care.
Such threats of publicity or well-funded lawsuits62 arise only
rarely, but are certain to be present when "repeat players," such as
vitalist and disability activists, enter the realm of end-of-life deci
sion-making law. "Repeat players" are those who are familiar with
the court system and who previously have engaged in litigation and
56. Press Release, Christian Commc'n Network, Terri Schiavo Attorney Calls on
Georgia Court to Feed Elderly Woman (Apr. 14, 2005) [hereinafter "Terri Schiavo At
torney Calls on Georgia Court to Feed Elderly Woman"] (on file with the author).
57. Id.
58. Compare Denis O'Hayer, Georgia Case Mirrors Schiavo Battle, llALIVE
NEWS, Apr. 8, 2005, http://www.llalive.comlnews/news_article.aspx?storyid=61478
(describing the circumstances of the dispute as of April 8, 2005), with Terri Schiavo
Attorney Calls on Georgia Court to Feed Elderly Woman, supra note 56 (dating the
involvement of the Schindlers' attorney to April 14, 2005).
59. See O'Hayer, supra note 58 (quoting the judge handling the case, Probate
Judge Donald Boyd, as saying that he had "been accused several times of murder" and
had received "close to a hundred e-mails"); James Joyner, Terri Schiavo Activists Move
On to Mae Magouirk (Apr. 9, 2005), http://www.outsidethebeltway.comlcategory/us_
politics/terrLschiavo3ase (follow the "Terri Schiavo Activists Move On to Mae
Magouirk" hyperlink) (blog entry discussing the Mae Magouirk case).
60. See O'Hayer, supra note 58.
61. Cruzan also sparked protests. See WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE,
THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN 360-78 (2002).
62. Jon Eisenberg has traced the funding for Ms. Schiavo's parents' side of the
litigation to major, wealthy foundations and has detailed the amounts that attorneys on
both sides of the controversy were paid. EISENBERG, USING TERRI, supra note 5, at 94
109.
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anticipate doing so in the future. 63 Repeat players have a number
of advantages over "one shotters" in any individual case. 64 For
example,
Repeat players have low stakes in the outcome of any particular
case and have the resources to pursue their long term interests.
They can anticipate legal problems and can often structure trans
actions and compile a record to justify their actions. They de
velop expertise and have access to specialists who are skilled in
dealing with particular types of cases or issues. They enjoy econ
omies of scale and encounter low start-up costs for any particular
case. 65

When individual cases like Schiavo are swept up in political storms
because of the involvement of repeat players,66 the power of those
players can be astonishing.
Use of litigation to achieve political ends is a time-honored tra
dition in some areas of the law,67 and this Article does not argue
that it is inappropriate in all cases. More than 30 years ago, Abram
Chayes recognized that much of the litigation in this country no
longer represented the traditional bipolar model of a lawsuit with
compensation for an injured plaintiff as its primary goal and a
party-initiated and party-controlled process. 68 Chayes identified a
form of lawsuit he labeled "public law litigation," in which "lawsuits
do not arise out of disputes between private parties about private
rights" but "the object of litigation is the vindication of constitu
tional or statutory policies. "69 School desegregation cases, prison
ers' rights cases, and certain corporate and environmental law
cases, to name a sampling, illustrate the public law litigation Chayes
63. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Lim
its of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'y REV. 95, 97-99 (1974).
64. "One shotters" are persons, businesses, or organizations that deal infre
quently with the legal system. [d. at 97.
65. Joel B. Grossman et aI., Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW &
SOC'y REV. 803, 803 (1999).
66. See Cerminara, Tracking the Storm, supra note 4 (detailing the involvement
of vitalist disability activists as Schiavo transformed from an individual case to a cause
celebre).
67. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1977)
(describing the path, through a series of court cases, toward the landmark U.S. Supreme
Court decision of Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954), ruling segregation
of the races in public schools unconstitutional).
68. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1282-84 (1976). Chayes spoke particularly of federal litigation but noted
that litigation in state courts followed a similar trend. [d. at 1284 n.12.
69. [d. at 1284.
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analyzed. 70 Using litigation to achieve what might be termed politi
cal ends, as Chayes described, can be appropriate in health care
settings, such as those in which patients with little consumer or po
litical power seek to call attention to the illegality of certain wide
spread, uniform practices on the part of insurers,71 or in which
advocacy groups seek to enjoin enforcement of regulatory policies
impacting health care access.72
Such use of litigation for political purposes is not appropriate,
however, in cases like Schiavo,73 In Schiavo, there was at issue no
widespread activity-no law, regulation, policy, or practice-affect
ing a large group of people. 74 Vitalist disability activists (who do
not constitute all disability activists)75 would argue that the decision
Mr. Schiavo made, to ask a court to authorize the withdrawal of
medically supplied nutrition and hydration from Ms. Schiavo, is in
fact indicative of common and widespread disability discrimination.
In the litigation itself, they argued that Mr. Schiavo, and others ad
vocating cessation of treatment, devalued Ms. Schiavo's existence
because of a disability from which she suffered,76 just as many other
persons with disabilities are inappropriately and illegally devalued
every day. In making that argument in court about Ms. Schiavo's
treatment, however, the activists who participated as amici curiae 77
70. Id.; see also Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights
Litigation as a Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REv. 2305, 2308 (2004) (describing
"public impact" litigation in the context of human rights).
71. Kathy L. Cerminara, The Class Action Suit as a Method of Patient Empower
ment in the Managed Care Setting, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8-11 (1998).
72. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von
Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (remanding action seeking to enjoin enforce
ment of a Food & Drug Administration policy limiting access to certain experimental
drugs), petition for reh'g denied, 469 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Grijalva v. Shalala, 946
F. Supp. 747 (D. Ariz. 1996) (alleging a breakdown in the federal government's system
of health maintenance organization oversight and review), affd, 152 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir.
1998), vacated, 526 U.S. 1096 (1999).
73. See generally Alan Meisel, The Role of Litigation in End of Life Care: A
Reappraisal, HASTINGS OrR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at S247.
74. See Chayes, supra note 68, at 1308 (describing one advantage of the public
law model as being that it permits "ad hoc applications of broad national policy in
situations of limited scope").
75. See Cerminara, Musings, supra note 3.
76. See, e.g., Schiavo ex reI. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005),
affg, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005), reh'g en bane denied, 403 F.3d 1261 (11th
Cir. 2005), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1692 (2005); Schiavo ex reI. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403
F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005), affg 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005), reh'g en bane
denied, 404 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2005), stay denied, 125 S. Ct. 1722 (2005). See generally
Bagenstos, Judging the Schiavo Case, supra note 3, at 457.
77. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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or who funded Ms. Schiavo's parents' efforts78 were misusing the
litigation process.
Rather than address the court in a case about the quintessen
tially individual features of Ms. Schiavo's situation, such activists
should have limited their involvement to legislative lobbying. End
of-life decision-making cases, including Ms. Schiavo's, are quintes
sentially individual, involving private matters such as life-and-death
choices, which most people agree should not even be in court, much
less litigated by interest groupS.79 It is only when some dissatisfied
individual or group of individuals with a personal stake in a case
seeks judicial review that such cases even go to court. They are
private. They are personal. They are individual. They stand in
sharp contrast to the sorts of cases involving allegations of wide
spread wrongdoing, such as those in which students and parents
challenge school segregation laws or patients seek review of uni
form insurance practices applied in determining payment or denial
of claims for health care coverage. There is no room in this per
sonal sort of litigation for forces other than those who know and
care for the patient. In Schiavo in particular, use of litigation for
broader political ends resulted in misdirection: "[T]he person of
Theresa Schiavo became lost in the media and political process,
particularly during the last two years of her life, when third party
interests attached themselves to her case."80 According to Ms.
Schiavo's guardian ad litem, who attempted to mediate a resolution
during late 2003, "Once third parties and the press became in
volved, the mold was set and there was no desire or capacity among
the parties to seek comprornise."81
In sum, Schiavo did not present the sort of situation in which
persons without political voice are trying to challenge a coherent
policy or law. 82 Contrary to the wishes of activists who attempted
to portray it as such, it was not the sort of case through which struc
78. See supra note 5.
79. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 23, at 3-7 (stating that generally deci
sions about foregoing treatment should be made in the clinical setting rather than
through the courts).
80. Wolfson, Schiavo's Lessons for Health Attorneys, supra note 25, at 547.
81. Jay Wolfson, Erring on the Side of Theresa Schiavo: Reflections of the Special
Guardian ad Litem, HASTINGS CTR. REp., May-June 2005, at 19.
82. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Es
chenbach, 445 F.3d 470 (D.C. Cir. 2006), petition for reh'g denied, 469 F.3d 129 (D.C.
CiT. 2006); KLUGER, supra note 67 (describing challenges to uniform statutory imple
mentations of "separate but equal" policies in schoolhouses across the land). Regard
ing the limits of litigation in the development of end-of-life decision-making law, see
Meisel, supra note 73.
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tural reform can be achieved to remedy broad-based legislative, ad
ministrative, or policy failures. 83 Rather, the case was a traditional
bipolar case, with private interests at issue, arising in an area of law
that calls for determinations based on the wishes of each individual
patient. The shame of Ms. Schiavo's case being hijacked in the judi
cial system by special interests, and the shame of the thought that
other family members, surrogate decision-makers, or health care
providers might feel "Schiavo' ed," is that the involvement of
outside political interests is uncommon, unnecessary, and improper
in this type of case.
B.

Lessons About the Tone and Pattern of End-of-Life Decision
Making

More broadly, the tenor of the Schiavo debate may have al
tered the tone and pattern of end-of-life decision-making law in
general. Addressing the broad questions at hand through litigation
is inappropriate, as just noted, but it is perfectly appropriate to ad
dress those broad questions in the legislative arena. In that arena,
some changes would still develop, although the lack of legislative
success in significantly revising state end-of-life decision-making
statutes thus far reinforces the impression that politicians erred in
introducing bills to do SO.84 Surveys and public-opinion polls cer
tainly indicate as much. 85 The law thus far has emerged intact, a
victory for those who celebrate the ability to refuse life-sustaining
treatment, including medically supplied nutrition and hydration.
The very fact that more than a dozen state legislatures considered
such bills, however, demonstrates the strength of the political forces
behind them. Those forces undoubtedly will continue to influence
this area of the law, in at least the following ways.
The National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), founded to
oppose Roe v. Wade,86 will continue, and may even strengthen, its
efforts to revise end-of-life decision-making law in accordance with
its mission of "restor[ing] legal protection to innocent human
83. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1979) (identifying such cases as the type in which judicial involvement on such a
broad scale is appropriate).
84. See Ellen Goodman, Deserting A Culture War, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 1,
2006, at 17A (asking, "What if they gave a culture war and nobody came?" with respect
to the failure of such legislation).
85. See generally Blendon et aI., supra note 32; PEW REPORT, supra note 49.
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a constitutional right to choose to
terminate a pregnancy).
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life. "87 The NRLC is the organization that drafted the model legis
lation that many legislators in Florida and other states unsuccess
fully introduced during and after Schiavo. The model legislation is
still available on the NRLC's website, and it is still playing with
emotions through its inflammatory title, the "Model State Starva
tion and Dehydration of Persons with Disabilities Prevention
Act."88 It has been amended since its initial promulgation,89 but it
remains available and ready for submission to legislators for rein
troduction in state legislatures. The NRLC's Terri's Legacy Plan,
currently dedicated to "build[ing] a network ... to help protect the
lives of people like" Ms. Schiavo, may lead to advocacy in favor of
the model legislation once initial network-building has gotten un
derway.9o Certainly the network, created through the Terri Schin
dler Schiavo Foundation, has advocacy as one of its goals. 91
The NRLC also has promulgated and displays prominently on
its website a "pro-life living will" titled The Will to Live.92 Strong
proponents of patient autonomy would have difficulty arguing that
it is inappropriate for a patient to make clear in a living will that he
or she wishes to receive certain treatments, but this document
seems to do more than offer that option. Lois Shepherd describes
this document and the NRLC website's descriptions of and justifi
87. H.B. 701, 2005 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005); Nat'l Right to Life Comm., Mission
Statement, http://www.nrlc.orglMissionstatement.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
88. NRLC MODEL Acr, supra note 30; see also Spurred by Schindler-Schiavo
Case, supra note 31.
89. Compare NRLC MODEL Acr, supra note 30 (bearing notation "revised Janu
ary 2006"), with H.B. 701,2005 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (version introduced in Flor
ida during the Schiavo debates).
90. See Terri's Legacy Project, http://www.nrlc.orgIProjects!Legacy!index.html
(last visited Jan. 16, 2007) (identifying Terri's Legacy Plan as helping to build the net
work created by "the Terri Schindler Schiavo Foundation (establiShed by Terri's par
ents, brother and sister)").
91. Terri Schindler Schiavo Found., About the Foundation, http://www.terrisfight.
orgimainlinks.php?table=main_abouUhe_foundation_2&id=143 (last visited Jan. 16,
2007).
92. See ROBERT POWELL CTR. FOR MED. ETHICS, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE, STATE
OF FLORIDA, HEALTHCARE SURROGATE, WILL TO LIVE FORM 7 (2005) [hereinafter
WILL TO LIVE FORM], available at http://www.nrlc.orgieuthanasia/willtolive/docs/
florida.revll05.pdf. Through the "Will to Live Project," individuals can get online ac
cess to "Will to Live" forms appropriate for the state that they live in. Nat'l Right to
Life Comm., "Will to Live" Project, http://www.nrlc.orgieuthanasia!willtolive/StatesList.
html (last visited Jan. 16, 2007); see also Nat'l Right to Life Comm., The Will to Live
Project, http://www.nrlc.orgleuthanasia/willtolive/index.html(last visited Jan. 16, 2007)
(for a discussion of the various reasons to fill out one of the offered forms); Terri Schin
dler Schiavo Found., Will to Live, http://www.terrisfight.orglquicklinks.php?id=41 (last
visited Jan. 16, 2007) (replication of the "Will to Live" form).
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cations for it, as having two aims: (1) to make people feel less se
cure about whether their end-of-life choices will be honored once
they are incapacitated, and (2) to make people choose rather than
refuse treatment. 93 Indeed, the document has a section titled "Gen
eral Presumption for Life" and specifies that "[f]ood and water are
not medical treatment, but basic necessities," so that nutrition and
fluids are to be administered by any means possible "to the full
extent necessary both to preserve [the signer's] life and to assure
[the signer] the optimal health possible."94 There is no need here to
address the legal inaccuracy of the statement discussing "food and
water" as if they were the same as medically supplied nutrition and
hydration. 95 Nor is this an appropriate point at which to discuss the
inadvisability of administering nutrition and hydration "to the full
extent possible."96 Rather, the importance of such statements in
this setting is to demonstrate how the NRLC seeks to continue to
influence people's attitudes and thought processes with respect to
end-of-life decision-making.
The NRLC Model Act also includes a provision that could
foreshadow an increase in investigative and regulatory oversight of
end-of-life decision-making. It specifically authorizes a "state pro
tection and advocacy agency" or a "public official with appropriate
jurisdiction to prosecute or enforce the laws" to file a lawsuit to
protest any proposed withholding or withdrawal of medically sup
plied nutrition and hydration. 97 Such authorization reaches beyond
the already-existing powers of such an official to take action to pre
vent abuse or violations of the law. To understand this, it is essen
tial to remember that the law currently contemplates private
medical decision-making, out of the spotlight, without the intrusion
of others except when one of those involved-someone acquainted
with the patient-protests a treatment decision. Court review does
not occur in the vast majority of cases, if all involved agree that a
93. Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals Following Schiavo, supra note 19.
94. WILL TO LIVE FORM, supra note 92, at 7.
95. See Cerminara, Musings, supra note 3, at 352-53.
96. For a graphic depiction of a situation in which it is possible to administer
medically supplied nutrition and hydration, yet one in which almost no one would think
it was a good idea, see Alicia J. Ouellette, When Vitalism is Dead Wrong: The Discrimi
nation Against and Torture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining
Treatment, 79 IND. L.J. 1, 13-18 (2004). The article describes the case of Sheila Pouliout.
97. NRLC MODEL Acr, supra note 30, § 5; see Shepherd, State Legislative Pro
posals Following Schiavo, supra note 19, at 15, 17 (describing proposals in Ohio to
essentially give priority to potential surrogate decision-makers who agree to provide
medically supplied nutrition and hydration).
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treatment decision is what the patient would have wanted. 98 In
contrast, this provision of the NRLC Model Act would authorize an
action for injunctive relief not only by persons who know the pa
tient but also by state officials
to secure a court determination, notwithstanding the position of a
guardian or surrogate, [as to] whether there is clear and convinc
ing evidence that the person legally incapable of making health
care decisions, when legally capable of making such decisions,
gave express and informed consent to withdrawing or withhold
ing hydration or nutrition in the applicable circumstances. 99

In other words, the Model Act would authorize governmental
officials to file a lawsuit against surrogate decision-makers and
health care providers to question withholding or withdrawal of
medically supplied nutrition and hydration even when all those ac
tually involved agree that withholding or withdrawal is appropriate.
The opinions of those who know best would not count in the sense
of shielding them from being dragged into court. Instead, members
of the NRLC and others sharing similar views alert state officials
about instances of the withholding or withdrawal of medically sup
plied nutrition and hydration because of a general policy-based be
lief that withholding or withdrawing it is always improper. lOo They
want the power of the government to extend beyond attempts to
intervene in cases in which individual wishes are determined,lOI and
instead affirmatively question the decisions of those who know the
patient best. State officials who are politically beholden to groups
such as the NRLC may begin to look for ways to do just that, re
gardless of whether the NRLC Model Act is passed within their
respective jurisdictions.
98. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 23, § 3.18[E] ("On balance, the courts
have been unreceptive to the idea of routine judicial review."); id. § 3.19 (describing
presumption against judicial review). But see id. § 3.22 (describing limited categories of
cases in which judicial review is required in some jurisdictions).
99. NRLC MODEL ACT, supra note 30, § SA (emphasis added).
100. As noted previously, in Schiavo, Florida's Department of Children and Fam
ilies (DCF) received more than 100 reports about Ms. Schiavo. Many were duplicative.
In re Records of the Dep't of Children & Family Servs., Nos. 05-1879-CI-003 & 05-2347
CI-003 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Apr. 14,2005), available at http://www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/
pdCfiles/DCF_Abuse_Investigations_parC1.pdf; see Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline,
supra note 1, at April 15, 2005 entry. Duplication would occur if, for example, many
people were calling DCF with separate reports based on the same e-mail or blog entry.
101. Cf In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 932 So. 2d 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(rejecting an attempt by Florida's Department of Children and Families to intervene in
the Schiavo case).
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Persons working in this area of the law also must prepare for
continued debate over standards of proof. Most states require that
clear and convincing evidence support a request for withholding or
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment from a patient who has no de
cision-making capacity.1 02 Florida law incorporates such a standard
of proof, and the courts found it satisfied, although, as commenta
tors have noted, the evidence supporting the conclusion that Ms.
Schiavo would not have wanted treatment was not overwhelm
ing. 103 Since Schiavo, calls have gone out for increased emphasis on
ensuring that evidence is truly clear and convincing before a court
may authorize withdrawal of treatment. 104 At least one commenta
tor has even argued for a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of
proof,105 reflecting the frustration felt by those who disagreed with
the courts' decisions in Schiavo. Battles over the standard of proof
will continue, which is unfortunate since the reality is that no one
talks about these issues with any level of specificity. To require too
much proof would be to sentence people to endure invasive treat
ment they do not want. Some people will lose their right to prevent
others from poking, prodding, and invading their bodies at a time
when they did not want such intervention, all because they did not
use specific enough language in discussing the matter in advance,
when they could not have known specifics. l06
Finally, Schiavo will reverberate in discussions about resource
allocation. Money and other resources such as labor, drugs, and
time are limited, and end-of-life treatment consumes its fair share
of each. In the opinion of Jay Wolfson, the guardian ad litem ap
pointed for Ms. Schiavo under Terri's Law, Schiavo will force peo
102. See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 23, § 3-10. This requirement prop
erly represents a judgment about how much evidence a court will require, not a deter
mination of the applicable substantive decision-making standard. See Meisel, supra
note 73, at S50 (noting the conflation of the burden of proof and the substantive deci
sion-making standard as a source of confusion).
103. Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals Following Schiavo, supra note 19, at
13-14; see also Shepherd, Shattering the Neutral Surrogate Myth, supra note 4, at 584.
104. Shepherd, State Legislative Proposals Following Schiavo, supra note 19, at
29; Elizabeth Price Foley, Legislature Can Get It Right This Time, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
4, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 23025509 (Westlaw) (proposing that the legislature
amend Florida law to specify factors to be considered in determining whether clear and
convincing evidence exists).
105. Steven G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law
Enacted by Congress and President Bush, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 151, 164-65 (2006).
106. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 32 (quoting a neurologist as saying "[ilt's ex
tremely difficult for people to anticipate every treatment about which decisions need to
be made in the future," and "it's simply unreasonable to expect young adults" to exe
cute advance directives).
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pIe to think differently about end-of-life resource allocation as a
matter of state and federal policy, institutional practice with respect
to technical treatments, and risk management. 107 Wolfson urges
that such consideration become explicit, saying, "If five years from
now, we should face another Schiavo case, it would be a tragedy of
public policy."108 It is unlikely, however, that policymakers, the
public, or even health care providers will address these issues ex
plicitly, despite the shadow of Schiavo. Once again, as with individ
uals who resist specifying their wishes clearly, it is difficult to
anticipate and talk about painful subjects.
C.

Lessons About Bioethics

It also is possible to go beyond end-of-life decision-making law
and see Schiavo as a symbol of generally increasing politicization in
bioethics. George Annas says that politicization has occurred gen
erally in bioethics over recent years,109 and Schiavo seems like an
illustration in stark relief.
One may identify politicization in bioethics through at least
two different techniques. The first is to examine the methods
through which persons speaking as bioethicists engage in analysis.
Annas notes that recent events involve individuals calling them
selves bioethicists who opine based upon their religious back
grounds and senses of morality rather than engaging in analysis
based upon principles, case-based reasoning, or other traditional
modes of philosophical discourse. llo For Annas, Schiavo illustrates
this phenomenon through the involvement in its latter stages of a
neurologist named William Cheshire.1 11 Eight days prior to Ms.
Schiavo's death, Dr. Cheshire signed an affidavit in support of
treatment discussing morality and ethics along with neurological
opinions.H 2 Based on this and other recent events in bioethics, An
nas asks whether "bioethics [must] accept rigid fundamentalist be
Wolfson, Schiavo's Lessons for Health Attorneys, supra note 25, at 551.
Id.
109. Annas, supra note 6, at 74-75 (referring to the appointment of Leon Kass, a
neoconservative in favor of banning stem cell research, as chair of the President's Coun
cil on Bioethics).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 73-74.
112. See Aff. of William Polk Cheshire, Jr. (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://
www6.miami.edu/ethics/schiavo/pdCfiles/032305_Cheshire_affidavit.pdf; see also
Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at "Dr. Cheshire's Affidavit" in March
23, 2005 entry.
107.

108.
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lievers as bioethicists just because they call themselves
bioethicists. "113
Alternatively, one may identify politicization in bioethics by
examining the way that bioethics has influenced the outcome of
overarching public policy debates. Autonomy and self-determina
tion have been the buzz words of power within bioethics over the
past forty or so years. Recently, however, those buzz words have
come under fire. Carol Levine sees a "sustained critique of individ
ual autonomy as a guiding principle" in a recent report issued by
the President's Council on Bioethics.1 14 Similarly, pointing in part
to debates over stem-cell and fetal tissue research, former member
of the National Bioethics Advisory Committee R. Alta Charo says
that "conservatives seem to feel that liberal bioethics has been an
obstacle to regulating medicine and scientific research" through its
emphasis on the principles of autonomy and self-determination.1 15
Bioethicists and the courts in Schiavo emphasized Ms. Schiavo's au
tonomy and self-determination as a basis for withdrawing her treat
ment; those opposing withdrawal of treatment argued that her
autonomy was not at issue because the only way she appropriately
could have exercised her autonomy was through an advance direc
tive, and she had no advance directive. Echoing Charo, it seems
that Schiavo protesters believed that by permitting an incapacitated
person's wishes to be determined through evidence other than a
written advance directive, "liberal bioethics has been an obstacle
to" regulation of medical decision-making. At both the beginning
and end of life, "bioethicists" with the qualifications Annas notes
are more frequently advancing political positions contrary to the
positions of those advocating autonomy and self-determination.
113. Annas, supra note 6, at 74.
114. Carol Levine, The President's Council on Autonomy: Never Mind!, HAS
TINGS CrR. REP., May-June 2006, at 46, 46-47. The report, titled Taking Care: Ethical
Caregiving in Our Aging Society, and available at http://www.bioethics.gov!reports!
takin~care!takin~care.pdf, criticizes instruction advance directives and questions in
volvement of family when a patient is unable to make his or her own health care deci
sions. Some of the criticism of advance directives is well-placed. See generally Angela
Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, HASTINGS CTR.
REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 30. But Levine notes, "If many Americans have signed ad
vance directives and appointed proxies in the aftermath of the Schiavo case, it was at
least partly to avoid family conflicts and to preserve family unity, not as an expression
of unbridled individual autonomy." Levine, supra, at 47. She sees the report as dimin
ishing those attempts.
115. R. Alta Charo, Passing on the Right: Conservative Bioethics is Closer Than It
Appears, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 307, 310 (2004) [hereinafter Charo, Passing on the
Right].
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This statement does not imply that consideration of religious
viewpoints necessarily leads to inappropriate politicization. Relig
ious viewpoints have always played a part in bioethics, including
authorizing refusals of life-sustaining treatment.1 16 The Roman
Catholic theological doctrine of double effect, for example, has be
come well-recognized in both bioethics and law.11 7 Yet there are
differences between religious and secular bioethics; most notably,
"[u]nlike secular bioethics, individual autonomy is not the ultimate
value in Catholic bioethics."118 Such differences should be recog
nized. Persons espousing Catholic theology or a Jewish mode of
moral analysis (to name but two different categories of religiously
based thought) generally have acknowledged the differences be
tween the two types of bioethics. 119 Notably, William Cheshire did
not identify himself as a moral theologian or even as being of a
particular moral background. He filed his affidavit as a bioethicist
and a neurologistPO It was only upon noticing certain facts in his
background and investigating him that the importance of his relig
ious beliefs in his decision-making process became clear.
Schiavo, in fact, turns out to be a prime example of a situation
in which "it is the politics we are debating more often than the
bioethics, and it may well be that sweeping political forces will de
termine the policy outcomes more than the merits of the individual
arguments."121 It is easy in this debate to forget that ethical analy
116. See, e.g., Daniel P. Sulmasy, Terri Schiavo and the Roman Catholic Tradition
of Forgoing Extraordinary Means of Care, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 359 (2005). See gen
erally Peter Clark, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics by David F. Kelly, 21 1.L.
& RELIGION 201, 201 (2005) (book review) ("The influence of religion on health care
ethics is often lost to many secular bioethicists today.").
117. See Edward C. Lyons, In Incognito: The Principle of Double Effect in Ameri
can Constitutional Law, 57 FLA. L. REV. 469,471-73 (2005).
118. Leonard 1. Nelson, III, Catholic Bioethics and the Case of Terri Schiavo, 35
CUMBo L. REV. 543,544 (2005). "Double effect, traced historically to Thomas Aquinas,
proposes that under certain circumstances, it is permissible unintentionally to cause un
foreseen 'evil' effects that would not be permissible to cause intentionally." Lyons,
supra note 117, at 471; see also MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 23, § 5.02[D]
(describing the "philosophical principle of double effect, originating in Roman Catholic
moral theology, which states that there are situations in which it is morally justifiable to
cause evil in the pursuit of good").
119. See, e.g., David M. Smolin, Does Bioethics Provide Answers?: Secular and
Religious Bioethics and Our Procreative Future, 35 CUMBo L. REV. 473 (2005); see also
Shelly Cohen, Note, De-Moralizing Death: A Humanistic Approach to the Sanctity of
Life, 14 ELDER L.J. 91 (2006).
120. See Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at "Dr. Cheshire's Affi
davit" in March 23, 2005 entry.
121. Charo, Realbioethik, supra note 33, at 14.

304

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:279

sis and public policy are two different things.122 In Schiavo, as with
so many other current issues, conversations revolved around ques
tions of human dignity rather than political philosophy.123
Unfortunately, however, the differences between those two ar
eas of concern are huge; debate over the role each of them does or
should play in American society in the twenty-first century will be
an ongoing theme of bioethics over the next few years.
D.

Lessons About American Constitutional Republican
Government

A broader political issue is the appropriate role of various
branches of government. While students of constitutional law are
(or at least should be) well-aware of the limits put on the various
branches of government in the American constitutional system, it
became painfully obvious during the legislative debates on Schiavo
that much of the general public was not. The courts especially were
attacked, through political statements, such as "[t]he actions on the
part of the Florida court are unconscionable,"124 and denunciations
of judges as activists for approving withdrawal of Ms. Schiavo's
medically supplied nutrition and hydration.1 25 It was obvious that
some members of the public, and perhaps some legislators, failed to
understand that trial courts engage in fact-finding and that appel
late courts are not and should not be empowered to revisit that fact
finding.n6 Similarly, it was obvious that citizens did not understand
122. Charo, Passing on the Right, supra note 115, at 311 (noting "the enduring
question of the relationship between ethical analysis and public policy. Moral angst is
one thing; federal criminalization of research or medical practice is another").
123. In describing the focus of the President's Commission on Bioethics, Charo
cautions against underestimating the "significant difference between arguing that some
thing is unethical and arguing that it is (or ought to be) prohibited by federal law." Id.
124. Santorum Fights to Save Life of Terri Schiavo (Mar. 17, 2005), reprinted in
THE CASE OF TERRI SCHIAVO: ETHICS AT THE END OF LIFE 130 (Arthur L. Caplan et
aI., eds., Prometheus Books 2006) (statement of U.S. Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.»; see
also Kurt Darr, Terri Schindler Schiavo: End-Game, 83 NEXUS 29, 30 (2005) (stating
that "many observers forgot their basic high school civics when they asserted that the
three branches of government ... are co-equal").
125. James J. Peters, Labels Create Chaos in Courts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar.
23,2005, at A15, available at 2005 WLNR 23739433 (Westlaw).
126. In response to a request from Ms. Schiavo's parents that the Florida District
Court of Appeal review the trial court's ruling de novo, the court reminded them, "It is
simply not proper for this court to review such a fact-intensive determination." In re
Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). Bowing to their concerns, how
ever, the court went a step further and assured them that it had dug into the evidence
and that "[iJf we were called upon to review the guardianship court's decision de novo,
we would still affirm it." [d.
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the way the judiciary serves as a "check" on the legislative and ex
ecutive branches in our system of government. 127 Regardless of
one's agreement or disagreement with the outcome of a particular
court case, there is value to upholding the court system and the way
it works. 128 Such a lesson is often a foundational point in basic civ
ics education. Yet it was lost in this case.
Perhaps it was lost because basic civics education seems to
have fallen by the wayside. In a survey administered to Florida
adults in December 2005, only 59 percent of those surveyed were
able to identify the three branches of government as being the judi
cial, executive, and legislative branches.1 29 The American Bar As
sociation conducted a nationwide poll showing the same results in
July 2005.13° In Florida, 16 percent of those surveyed identified the
government's branches as "Republican, Democrat and Indepen
dent," in a stunning demonstration of just how much power politi
cal parties have. 131
Such findings prompted the Florida Bar to lobby for and to
engage in more civics education, and its lobbying efforts resulted in
the passage of a law requiring students in public middle schools to
successfully complete "[t]hree middle school or higher courses in
social studies, one semester of which must include the study of state

127. For example, ignoring the fact that Ms. Schiavo's medically supplied nutri
tion and hydration had been withdrawn in accordance with a duly entered, final court
order, activists pressured Governor Bush to "protect" Ms. Schiavo from "abuse" by
removing her from her hospice and reinserting the tube through which she could re
ceive that nutrition and hydration. See David Sommer & Blaine Silversmith, Legal
Defeats Mount for Schiavo Parents, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 25, 2005, available at http://
www.tampatrib.comIMGBH2MOZP6E.html(quoting activist as saying, "Gov. Bush and
the Department of Children and Families do not have to ask permission of a judge to
enforce the statutes that are on the books .... It's an appalling lack of will"); see also
Keville & Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 12. But see Bagenstos, Judging the Schiavo Case,
supra note 3, at 471-72 (arguing that the courts at the federal level failed to respect
Congress).
128. Kathy L. Cerminara, With Schiavo, Congress Thumbs Nose at Courts, OR.
LANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 2005, at A15, available at 2005 WLNR 23739416 (Westlaw).
129. Bar Pushes for More Civics Education, FLA. BAR NEWS, Feb. 1, 2006, at 1
[hereinafter Bar Pushes for More Civics Education]; see also Press Release, The Florida
Bar, Poll Shows Need for More Civics Education for Florida Adults (Jan. 11, 2006)
(with other supporting information about the poll and the Bar's efforts) (on file with
Western New England Law Review), available at http://www.floridabar.orglTFBrrFB
Public.nsflWNewsReleases/07303EEA70164467852570F20079DACE?OpenDocument.
130. See AM. BAR Assoc., CiVICS EDUCATION (2005), available at http://www.
abanews.orgldocs/divisionofpowers_705.pdf.
131. Bar Pushes for More Civics Education, supra note 129.
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and federal government and civics education."132 One hopes that
such a step will help remedy this breathtaking lack of knowledge,
reminiscent of the misunderstanding of governmental structure dis
played during Schiavo. Such misunderstanding clearly is more
widespread than one might hope or expect, and it has its roots in a
lack of sufficient knowledge of governmental basics.
In the Schiavo controversy, many spoke about how the elected
representatives of the people were coming to the rescue of a wo
man lying in bed, while activist judges did not care about her. Such
arguments ignore the fact that, in Florida, judges, including the trial
court judge who decided Schiavo, are eIected.133 They also ignore
the fact that legislators, the peoples' elected representatives, later
realized that they had not been acting in accordance with the ma
jority's wishes, but only in accordance with the wishes of the most
vocal, when they acted. 134 Rather, as Annas has quoted Jeffrey
Rosen:
[T]he conservative interest groups have it exactly backward.
Their standard charge is that unelected judges are thwarting the
will of the people by overturning laws passed by elected repre
sentatives. But in our new topsy-turvy world, it's the elected rep
resentatives who are thwarting the will of the people, which is
being channeled instead by unelected judges.135

In Schiavo's aftermath ultimately lies an opportunity to improve
citizens' involvement in and awareness of end-of-life decision-mak
ing. Whether that happens, however, may depend at least in part
on how well basic civics educational efforts work.
132. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1003.4156(1)(a)(3) (West 2006); see Gary Blankenship,
More Emphasis To Be Placed On Civics Education, FLA. BAR NEWS, June 1, 2006, at l.
Others have noted a similar need for education about end-of-life treatment and deci
sion-making. Mayo, supra note 18, at 590; James L. Bernat, What Relevance to Neurol
ogists Is the Tragic Case of Terri Schiavo?, 5 NEUROLOGY TODAY 4, 5 (May 2005)
(advocating "professional and public education about the medical facts of patients with
states of impaired consciousness").
133. Judge Greer, in fact, faced a re-election challenge. He won by a healthy
margin. Cerminara & Goodman, Timeline, supra note 1, at Aug. 31, 2004 entry.
134. See Annas, supra note 6, at 78 n.109 (citing polls conducted immediately
before and after Ms. Schiavo's death indicating that "seventy-six percent of Americans
disapproved of congressional involvement in the Schiavo case ... eighty-two percent of
Americans sa[id] Congress and the President should stay out of deciding what happens
to Terri Schiavo," and "seventy-five percent of Americans say it was 'not right' for
Congress to intervene in the Schiavo case").
135. Id. at 78 (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Center Court, N.Y. TIMES WKLY. 6-17
(June 12, 2005)).
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CONCLUSION

More than a year after Theresa Schiavo's death, little has
changed. The judicial rulings in her case and the ultimate impact of
the statutes passed to address her situation have, for the most part,
left intact previously existing end-of-life decision-making law. Yet
it is possible to recognize both existing and potential effects of the
political culture wars surrounding Ms. Schiavo's death.
Regardless of their positions with respect to Ms. Schiavo's case
in particular, most observers would believe that its effect was posi
tive in the sense that it heightened citizens' awareness of certain
areas of the law. More people than before began discussing end-of
life treatment choices with their families and friends as a result of
Schiavo. More people than before obtained and executed forms for
written advance directives in attempts to ensure that their families
and friends did not have to debate what they would want done if
they ended up lying in a PVS, dependent on medically supplied nu
trition and hydration. Schiavo also increased recognition of the
limited amount most Americans know and understand about the
way their government works. Schiavo did some good to the extent
that it may result in better end-of-life decision-making processes
and in more educational efforts to assist citizens in playing their
roles in society.
Collateral damage also exists, however. The political culture
wars surrounding the final months of Ms. Schiavo's life confirmed
the existence of deep schisms between certain factions of society.
Those who joined in the protests against withdrawal of Ms. Schi
avo's medically supplied nutrition and hydration raised questions
about extremely well-settled areas of law and bioethics. They did
so in an emotionally charged atmosphere, using rhetoric and im
agery that is not likely to quickly fade. They continue to advocate
legislative changes that were proposed and failed to pass during the
final period of Ms. Schiavo's life.
In this manner, the Schiavo experience could cast a pall over
future end-of-life decision-making in at least three ways. First, the
media spectacle it turned into is likely to lurk as a threat in the
minds of surrogate decision-makers and health-care providers,
whose primary goal instead should be to worry about doing what
the patient would have wanted. Second, and more broadly, activists
will continue to attempt to change the law in a manner that would
diminish the focus on individual patients and substitute broad
based restrictions on individual patient choice. Finally, Schiavo
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symbolizes the sort of politicization of bioethics that many in the
business of providing health care likely wish they could avoid.
Medical care and end-of-life decision-making are supposed to be
about what individual patients need and the way they want their
lives to end, not about the symbolism that politically motivated
groups can attach to each case.

